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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court in this case sentenced Mr. Reed not based on his current
methamphetamine possession conviction, but on his past alleged sex offenses.  It went on to
relinquish jurisdiction after learning that Mr. Reed could not afford to pay for treatment at Good
Samaritan and did not participate in a polygraph about his alleged sex offenses.  As for its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction, the court abused its discretion by basing that decision on
Mr. Reed’s indigence and his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to silence.  Regarding
Mr. Reed’s initial sentencing, the court abused its discretion by focusing largely on Mr. Reed’s
prior alleged sex offenses.  This Court should therefore remand this case for a new rider review
hearing in front of a new judge or reduce Mr. Reed’s sentence as it deems appropriate.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In exchange for Mr. Reed’s guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine, the State agreed
to recommend a retained jurisdiction and to not object to Mr. Reed being screened for drug court.
(R., p.34; 3/16/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-25, p.9, L.14 – p.10, L.1.)  At sentencing, the State
recommended a retained jurisdiction and defense counsel recommended, consistent with the PSI
investigator, that the court place Mr. Reed on probation.  (5/24/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-21; PSI, p.20.)
If Mr. Reed could get accepted into Good Samaritan’s treatment program, defense counsel asked
that his participation in that program be a condition of his probation.  (5/24/16 Tr., p.18,
Ls.8-17.)  After Mr. Reed addressed the court, the court said:
THE COURT:  I have some questions for you. . . .  Ordinarily I don’t put a
whole lot of importance in things in a presentence report’s prior criminal
reiteration that aren’t—where I don’t know the outcome, but in August 16th of
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2006 you committed and were found guilty of battery.  I don’t know whether
that’s a felony or a misdemeanor.    You haven’t clarified that.  But you were also
charged with oral copulation with a person under sixteen, sexual penetration with
a foreign object of a victim under sixteen, and a knowing, et cetera, of a child, I
have no idea what that is, under eighteen I guess, and that was when you were
twenty-three, so what’s your story of what happened there?
(5/24/16 Tr., p.19, L.22 – p.20, L.11.)  The court went on to ask Mr. Reed to explain each of the
sex and domestic crimes listed in his PSI, many of which were marked as “dismissed” or
“disposition not received.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p.20, L.12 – p.25, L.14; PSI, pp.6-13.)  Finally, the
court asked Mr. Reed to explain the tattoo on his neck, which apparently reads “trust no bitch,”
and his involvement in the “white boy gang.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p.25, L.14 – p.26, L.7; PSI, p.4.)
The court then sentenced Mr. Reed to serve seven years fixed and retained jurisdiction.
(5/24/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-21.)  The Court added:
I will need a polygraph on your return regarding your account of past sexual
offenses and past violence towards women, and if you do all those things, then I
will not consider you for probation unless you can get into Good Samaritan for
ten months. . . .
. . . .
. . . The reason for your sentence is your criminal record, and while I realize that
there were dismissals on the sex crimes that I asked you about, I have several
concerns about your explanation given the fact that there are three different events
over  the  course  of  .  .  .  five  different  years.   There’s  violence  to  women  on
multiple occasions.  You’ve got a huge drug problem.  You’ve been to prison.
You’ve joined a gang.
I’m not overly optimistic about granting you probation sometime in the
future, but those are the things you need to do.  You need to get anger treatment
while you’re in the penitentiary, chemical dependency while in the penitentiary,
come back with the polygraph, and commit to going to Good Samaritan for ten
months. . . .
(5/24/16 Tr., p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.21; see also R., p.41 (the judgment of conviction dictating the
same requirements).)
At the rider review hearing, both the State and defense counsel asked that the court place
Mr. Reed on probation because he did well on his rider.  (1/10/17 Tr., p.31, L.8 – p.32, L.22.)
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Indeed, Mr. Reed received only informal sanctions and no formal DORs, and so the IDOC also
recommended probation.  (PSI, pp.45-`60.)  The district court, however, focused on its order that
Mr. Reed take a polygraph and get into Good Samaritan’s treatment program.
THE COURT:     .  .  .  Back  on  May 24th,  2016,  when I  sent  you  on  this
rider I recommended a CAPP Rider . . . to deal with addictions and past violence,
and I also said you will need to have a polygraph on your return regarding your
account of past  sex offenses and violence towards women, and you will  need to
do Good Samaritan for ten months, so I take it you’re not interested in Good
Samaritan?
THE DEFENDANT:  I didn’t have the money at the time because—at that
time I said I  might have the money, but I  didn’t  have the money.  I  called them
and I told them that and, uh—
THE COURT:  And I take it you don’t have a polygraph?
THE DEFENDANT:  No.
THE  COURT:   Ok,  well  I  meant  what  I  said.   I  am  going  to  relinquish
jurisdiction, impose the prison sentence that I originally imposed which was seven
years fixed—
THE DEFENDANT:  I have to do seven years?
THE  COURT:   Let  me  finish,  please.   Seven  years  fixed,  zero  years
indeterminate, total of seven.  I will modify that slightly to six years fixed, one
year indeterminate only for the purpose of trying to give you some incentive to do
well while you’re in prison and behave yourself so that you can get out; really it’s
only  to  try  to  incentivize  your  conduct  while  you’re  in  the  penitentiary.    You
don’t have either the polygraph or the—
THE DEFENDANT:  I never—
THE COURT:   —the  arrangement  to  live  at  Good Samaritan,  and  that’s
what I told you back in May. . . .
(1/10/17 Tr., p.33, L.8 – p.34, L.14; see also R., pp.47-48.)
That same day, Mr. Reed filed a motion for redisposition.  (R., p.45.)  It explained that
defense counsel “neglected to make a clear record regarding the Defendant’s assertion of his 5th
amendment right in regards to the Court’s request that the Defendant participate in a polygraph
examination related to conduct separate and distinct to the charge in this matter,” and asked for a
new rider review hearing so that counsel could make the record clear.  (R., p.45.)
At the redisposition hearing, defense counsel explained that the notes of the substitute
attorney who attended the sentencing hearing with Mr. Reed had indicated that she had asserted
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Mr. Reed’s Fifth Amendment rights.  (2/27/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-10.)  But, after the rider review
hearing, defense counsel got a copy of the minutes of the sentencing hearing and realized that
she had not.  (2/27/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.14-17.)  Therefore, defense counsel clarified that Mr. Reed had
not participated in the polygraph because he was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights under
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534 (2016).1
Defense counsel argued that Van Komen “makes it clear that someone in Mr. Reed’s situation
does have a right to assert their privilege, and that the assertion of that privilege should not be the
basis of relinquishing jurisdiction.”  (2/27/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.4-8.)
The State responded that it did not believe a motion for redisposition was the appropriate
“vehicle” for counsel’s request, if he was asking that the court revisit Mr. Reed’s sentence.
(2/27/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-18.)  But, to the extent counsel wanted to make the record clear for
appellate purposes, the State said,
I would ask that this Court refine the record as to its intention, if that’s the case, as
to why he was sent to—if you are indeed punishing him for the exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights, perhaps the appellate courts must know that so they can
make a decision regarding the viability of the sentence.  Otherwise, if Your Honor
did not punish him for asserting his Fifth Amendment Right and impose
accordingly,  I  would  ask  that  that  also  be  put  on  the  record  and  subject  to
appellate review.
(2/27/17 Tr., p.4, L.19 – p.5, L.5.)
After  taking  another  look  at Van Komen, the district court denied Mr. Reed’s motion.
(2/27/17 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.3.)  It explained that this case is “significantly different” from
Van Komen:
First of all, I’m not even sure—well, there was no statement that Mr. Reed wished
to maintain his Fifth Amendment Right [sic] to remain silent back at sentencing
1 This Court decided Van Komen a couple of months after the district court sentenced Mr. Reed
and about six months before the district court relinquished jurisdiction.
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on May 24th, 2016, nor at the Rider Review Hearing, which was held on
January 10th, 2017.  And I don’t think that occurred in VanKomen [sic] either.
But there was never indication [sic] when I imposed the requirement on the rider,
or when I had the rider review hearing, that Mr. Reed wished to invoke his Fifth
Amendment Right [sic].  Even if he had, what I was seeking clarification on when
I sent Mr. Reed on a rider on May 24th, 2016—I’ll just quote from my order.
 I  was  recommending  a  [CAPP]  rider  to  deal  with  addiction  and  past
violence.  Will need a polygraph on return regarding his account of past sex
offenses and violence towards women, and will have to do good Samaritan ten-
month program.
When I sentenced Mr. Reed and sent him on a retained, he—we discussed
those prior offenses.  And in 2010, sexual intercourse with a minor under the age
of  18,  he,  Mr.  Reed,  explained  that  he  was  living  with  parents  of  a  minor,  and
2006 incident that he pled guilty to battery to resolve the case, that all the
remaining charges were dismissed.  So, I don’t even know that there is the ability
to be charged for past conduct.  Let’s assume that there is.  And in that case, in
that assumed set of facts, or under that assumed set of facts, VanKomen [sic]
says—I’ll just quote from it.
“However, the Court in its own words relinquished jurisdiction solely
because  defendant  refused  to  waive  his  Fifth  Amendment  Right  [sic]  to  answer
questions that could incriminate him and result in new felony charges.”
And that’s not the case here.
The minutes reflect—I assume the transcript on appeal will reflect that I
relinquished jurisdiction on Mr. Reed for two reasons.  We don’t have on [sic] a
polygraph of any sort, and there was no arrangement to live at Good Samaritan.
That is—
(2/27/17 Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.7, L.20.)  At that point, Mr. Reed interrupted:
THE DEFENDANT:  Yeah, there was.
THE COURT:  That is what I told you back in May and—
THE DEFENDANT:  I—I had got ahold of MJ at Pastor Tim’s program
(unintelligible).
THE COURT:  I’m sorry, Mr. Reed.
THE DEFENDANT:  What’s that?
THE COURT:  It’s my turn to talk.  And if your attorney wants to call you
as a witness, he can do that, but I’ve made my record.
(2/27/17 Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.5.)  The court then ended the hearing.
In its written order on redisposition filed a month later, the court gave two reasons for
denying the motion:
This Court finds that the present case is distinguishable from the case of
State v. Van Komen, 160 Id 534 (2016), in that in that case the Supreme Court
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found error in the District Court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction over the
Defendant based solely upon the Defendant’s refusal to waive his 5th Amendment
rights against self-incrimination by participating in a court ordered polygraph
examination.  In the present case, the Court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is
based upon two factors, first, that the Defendant has failed to participate in a
polygraph  examination  and  second,  that  the  Defendant  failed  to  make
arrangements to participate in the “Good Samaritan” program upon his return
from the retained jurisdiction program.  Therefore, the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction is not based solely upon the Defendant’s refusal to participate in a
polygraph examination.
Further this Court finds that neither at the time of sentencing on May 24,
2016 or at the time of the jurisdictional review hearing on January 10, 2017, did
the Defendant claim that the reason that he had failed to participate in the court
ordered polygraph examination was due to an assertion of his 5th Amendment
rights against self-incrimination.
(R., pp.72-73.)
Mr. Reed later filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.  (R., p.70.)
At a hearing on that motion, Mr. Reed testified that he did not get into the Good Samaritan
program because “they said [he] had a sex case” and he didn’t have $2500.  (5/1/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.15-22.)  Mr. Reed said that the sex case was not consistent with his criminal history.  (5/1/17
Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.1.)  He also told the court that he had been going to school in prison,
attending support groups and bible study, and working in the kitchen.  (5/1/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.)
He had a plan for when he is released—he would get a job, participate in narcotics anonymous,
and continue working on his sobriety.  (5/1/17 Tr., p.10, L.19 – p.11, L.16.)  Defense counsel
clarified that,
at this juncture and at the time of his jurisdictional review hearing the Good
Samaritan program was not an option for him, partly due to funding as Mr. Reed
testified to.  $2500 is a substantial amount of money for an indigent defendant to
obtain while incarcerated, and so it is his position that the condition set forth upon
Mr. Reed by this court that he gain entry into the Good Samaritan program was
something that he was unable to satisfy as a result of his indigency and
incarceration.
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(5/1/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-12.)  Mr. Reed asked that the court consider placing him on probation or
reduce his sentence to five years fixed with two years indeterminate.  (5/1/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-18,
p.13, Ls.6-9, p.16, Ls.17-24.)
The district court denied the motion.  It explained that defense counsel didn’t list
Mr. Reed’s performance since his incarceration as a basis in his motion, but even if the court did
consider that ground, it expects a defendant to take advantage of those opportunities.  (5/1/17 Tr.,
p.17, Ls.1-9.)  As for the Good Samaritan program, the court said,
Well, I don’t know how you get new information to explain what you didn’t do at
the time that I required Mr. Reed to do it, and there wasn’t any explanation given
in my review of the court minutes on February 27th—I’m sorry.  That was the re-
disposition hearing. There wasn’t any evidence presented on behalf of the defense
at the jurisdictional review hearing about not being able to afford Good
Samaritan or not being able to get into Good Samaritan because of a prior sex
offense, so I’m simply not able to understand how an additional reason could be
arrived at after the pertinent point in time which was January 10th, 2017, and even
if that were true, even if it were the case that he couldn’t get into Good Samaritan
because  of  a  prior  sex  offense,  that  should’ve  been  explained  to  the  Court  way
back at the time of sentencing on May 24th, 2016, and what was told to me on
May 24th, 2016, by Ms. Chesebro at the time on behalf of Mr. Reed was that he’s
made contact with Good Samaritan, not confident that finances will be there, but
that was the only explanation given, and that’s the day that I required Mr. Reed,
when he came back for his rider review, to have it set up that he get into Good
Samaritan.  It says it on his court order.  I said it on the record.
And I also directed him to have a polygraph regarding his account of past
sex offenses and violence towards women and he didn’t have that either, so he
didn’t do any of the things that he needed to do when he came back from his
jurisdictional review and apparently he still doesn’t.  He still doesn’t have any
plan  to  get  into  Good  Samaritan  or  anything  similar,  and certainly nothing to
assure the Court that the risk posed in his presentence report as to prior sex
offenses and abuse towards women has been mitigated at all, and it’s not just one
event.
I mean, it’s an event on August 16th, 2006, in Redding County, oral
copulation with a person under sixteen, sexual penetration with a foreign object,
victim under sixteen, and then a third crime, he pled guilty to battery and at
sentencing  claimed  that  there  was  some  underage  contact,  but  pled  guilty  to
battery to resolve it, so some contact tells me that there’s still an event there,
there’s still a bad act; 2007 sex with a minor in High Desert County, California.
Defendant’s explanation at that time was it never happened, it was all hearsay,
and there’s no conviction there, so I have to believe Mr. Reed at the time, but then
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there’s  a  2010  sexual  intercourse  with  a  minor  under  the  age  of  eighteen.   The
defendant’s explanation was that he was living with a girl and living with that
girl’s parents at the time.  That doesn’t change the fact that that girl wasn’t of age
of consent.  Then there’s all of the violent acts, and there’s been no explanation
as to any of those at sentencing, at the jurisdictional review, at the present time.
I have no idea what—well, I do have an idea as to the type of person that
we’re  dealing  with:  A  person  who  affiliated  with  White  Boy  Gang  while  in
prison, a person who’s been in prison on and off for quite a period of time, and
again, came back from a jurisdictional review with some pretty clear and
relatively simple requirements to have done in order to be considered for
probation and chose not to do any of those.
I’ve already made my reduction.  I’ve converted it from seven fixed to six
years fixed and one year indeterminate to try to give Mr. Reed an incentive to do
well while he’s in serving the fixed portion of his sentence, and to try to help him
not become an individual—an institutionalized individual, but my first duty is to
protect the public, and Mr. Reed chose not to come back to court with the things
that he needed to do in order for me to make that assessment and convince me that
I’m not dealing with a person who is as dangerous as he appears in the
evaluations and the reports that I have, so if you’d please prepare an order to that
effect, Ms. Montalvo.
(5/1/17 Tr., p.17, L.20 – p.20, L.22 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Reed filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order relinquishing
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.49-51.)
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and denying
Mr. Reed’s motion for redisposition because Mr. Reed could not afford the Good Samaritan
program and asserted his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to the polygraph?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Reed largely based on his




The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction And Denying Mr. Reed’s
Motion For Redisposition Because Mr. Reed Could Not Afford The Good Samaritan Program
And Asserted His Fifth Amendment Rights With Respect To The Polygraph
The district court at sentencing imposed two unqualified conditions on Mr. Reed’s ability
to earn a chance at probation—he had to get admitted into Good Samaritan’s treatment program
and he had to take a polygraph on past allegations of sexual and domestic crimes.  When
Mr. Reed failed to meet those conditions because he could not afford treatment and because he
exercised his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  Because the
district court did not reach that decision through an exercise of reason and did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion.
A. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729 (2013).  A court properly exercises its discretion when it:
(1) correctly perceives the issue to be one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Because
Mr. Reed Could Not Afford Good Samaritan’s Treatment Program
By relinquishing Mr. Reed because he did not get into Good Samaritan’s treatment
program, which he could not afford, the district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise
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of reason.2  The  court  was  well  aware  that  Mr.  Reed  was  indigent.   (R.,  pp.2324 (Mr.  Reed’s
financial statement and order appointing a public defender).)  Indeed, Mr. Reed said at the
sentencing hearing that he may not have the funds to get into the Good Samaritan program
(5/24/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-17), and he tried to convey as much at the rider review hearing:  “I didn’t
have  the  money at  the  time because—at  that  time I  said  I  might  have  the  money,  but  I  didn’t
have the money.  I called them and I told them that and, uh—”  (1/10/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.16-19).
Rather than listen to Mr. Reed’s explanation, the district court cut him off.  (1/10/17 Tr., p.33,
Ls.19-20; see also 2/27/17 Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.5 (Mr. Reed trying to explain why he did not
get into Good Samaritan during the redisposition hearing, and the district court again cutting him
off).)3  It appears that the district court didn’t find the reason for Mr. Reed’s noncompliance
relevant, even when that reason was Mr. Reed’s indigence.  In fact, it appears the district court
believed that Mr. Reed was making up an excuse for his noncompliance, when he had in fact
said, on the record at the relinquishment hearing, that he “didn’t have the money.”  (1/10/17 Tr.,
p.33, L.8 – p.34, L.14; see also 5/1/17 Tr., p.17, L.20 – p.20, L.22 (the district court incorrectly
stating that “[t]here wasn’t any evidence presented on behalf of the defense at the jurisdictional
review hearing about not being able to afford Good Samaritan or not being able to get into Good
Samaritan because of a prior sex offense, so I’m simply not able to understand how an additional
2 Although the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a defendant has no liberty interest in probation
during a period of retained jurisdiction, State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 367 P.3d 185, 192
(2016), Mr. Reed contends that holding is incorrect and that the district court violated his due
process and equal protection rights by relinquishing jurisdiction based on his indigence, see, e.g.,
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 609 (Ct. App.
2007).
3 Relatedly, as was discussed later on in the proceedings, Mr. Reed may have been ineligible for
Good Samaritan’s program because he has a past conviction for a sex offense.  (5/1/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.15-22.)   That  does  not  change  the  fact  that,  knowing  what  it  knew  at  the  time,  the  district
court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.  Nor does it change the fact that, with
appropriate treatment, Mr. Reed could be a suitable candidate for probation.
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reason could be arrived at after the pertinent point in time which was January 10th, 2017.”).)
Therefore, the district court did not reach its decision to relinquish jurisdiction by an exercise of
reason because it denied Mr. Reed the opportunity to explain his efforts to get into Good
Samaritan and ignored the only explanation he was able to give—that he was unable to pay for
Good Samaritan.
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Reed’s Fifth Amendment Rights By Relinquishing
Jurisdiction Because He Did Not Take A Polygraph About His Past Alleged Sex
Offenses
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”  “The United States Supreme Court has held the Fifth
Amendment protects against the use of a witness’s compelled answers and ‘evidence derived
therefrom’ in any subsequent criminal trial.” State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 193 (2000)
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973)).  This right “is not ordinarily dependent
upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used.  It applies
alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility  him  who  gives  it.” State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 538 (2016) (quoting
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)).  This includes relinquishment proceedings.
Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 539.  Further, “as a general rule, countervailing government interests,
such as criminal rehabilitation, do not trump this right.” United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d
1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005).
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1. Because The District Court Considered Mr. Reed’s Fifth Amendment Rights At
Redisposition, But Denied The Motion And Affirmed Its Decision To Relinquish
Jurisdiction, This Issue Is Preserved For Review
“Generally Idaho’s appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal
through an objection at trial.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Here, although Mr. Reed did not expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at the sentencing
or relinquishment hearings, on redisposition he did assert those rights, and explained that he
intended to assert those rights from the outset.  (R., p.45; 2/27/17 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-17.)   The State
agreed it would be appropriate for Mr. Reed to clarify his position and for the court to “refine the
record” regarding its ruling on the polygraph so the reason for relinquishment is “on the record
and subject to appellate review.”  (2/27/17 Tr., p.4, L.19 – p.5, L.5.)  That’s precisely what the
court did—it explained its reasons for relinquishing jurisdiction and attempted to distinguish its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction here from its decision to relinquish jurisdiction in Van Komen.
Therefore, this issue is properly preserved for appellate review.4
2. Mr. Reed Faced A Risk Of Incrimination For Participating In The Polygraph, And
Suffered A Penalty Amounting To Compulsion For Refusing To Take The
Polygraph
To establish a Fifth Amendment claim, a witness must show that:  (1) the testimony
sought by the government carried the risk of incrimination; and (2) the penalty faced for refusing
to testify amounted to compulsion. See Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 538, 540; Antelope, 395 F.3d
4 Should  the  Court  disagree,  Mr.  Reed’s  claim  prevails  under  even  the  fundamental  error
standard of review.  The district court’s decision violated Mr. Reed’s unwaived Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, the error is clear from the record, and the error undoubtedly
affected the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
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at 1134; see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (J. O’Connor, concurring5) (“The text
of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to
incriminate  himself  or  herself—it  prohibits  only  the  compulsion  of  such  testimony .  .  .  .   [A]s
suggested by the text of the Fifth Amendment, we have asked whether the pressure imposed in
such situations rises to a level where it is likely to ‘compe[l]’ a person ‘to be a witness against
himself.’”) (emphasis added).
To satisfy the first prong, the witness must face “a real and appreciable danger of self-
incrimination.” Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134 (quoting McCoy v. Comm’r, 969 F.2d 1234, 1236
(9th Cir. 1983)).  “This is not to say . . . that the prosecutorial sword must actually strike or be
poised to strike,” but the threat cannot be “remote, unlikely, or speculative.” Id. at 1134; see also
Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 538 (discussing how Van Komen could have exposed himself to
criminal prosecution for rape, lewd conduct, and sexual battery by discussing his alleged sexual
relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl).
To meet the second prong, the defendant need only face “any penalty for asserting the
right to remain silent that was likely to compel an incriminating statement.” Van Komen,
160 Idaho at 540; see also Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1135 (the question is “whether the government
has sought to ‘impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.’”) (quoting Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977)).
Mr. Reed faced a risk of incrimination for participating in the polygraph, and suffered a
penalty amounting to compulsion for refusing to take it.  First, the polygraph carried a real and
5 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion was the narrowest and thus controls. See Antelope,
395 F.3d at 1133 n.1.
15
appreciable risk of incrimination.  The district court ordered Mr. Reed to be polygraphed on his
“account of past sexual offenses and past violence towards women.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p.26, L.21 –
p.27, L.1.)  That would encompass his prior criminal history of allegations of sexual offenses and
violence against women, many of which were dismissed for unknown reasons or had unknown
dispositions, and perhaps other crimes that were absent from Mr. Reed’s criminal history.
(5/24/16 Tr., p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.21; see also R., p.41; PSI, pp. 6-13.)  A polygraph regarding
Mr. Reed’s past sexual offenses and violence against women, in the hands of the court and
prosecutor, would present a real and appreciable risk of incrimination.
Second, Mr. Reed in fact suffered a penalty amounting to compulsion for not taking the
polygraph.  At the relinquishment hearing, the court made it clear why it was relinquishing
jurisdiction:
THE COURT:  . . . Back on May 24th, 2016, when I sent you on this rider
I recommended a CAPP Rider . . . to deal with addictions and past violence, and I
also said you will need to have a polygraph on your return regarding your account
of past sex offenses and violence towards women, and you will need to do Good
Samaritan for ten months. . .
THE COURT:  And I take it you don’t have a polygraph?
THE DEFENDANT:  No.
THE  COURT:   Ok,  well  I  meant  what  I  said.   I  am  going  to  relinquish
jurisdiction, impose the prison sentence that I originally imposed which was seven
years fixed—
. . . .
. . . You don’t have either the polygraph or the—
. . . .
—the arrangement to live at Good Samaritan,6 and that’s what I told you back in
May. . . .
6 At the redisposition hearing, the district court distinguished its relinquishment of Mr. Reed
from its impermissible relinquishment in Van Komen by stating that here, unlike in Van Komen,
it was relinquishing both because Mr. Reed did not participate in the polygraph and because he
did not get into Good Samaritan.  (R., pp.72-73; 2/27/17 Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.7, L.20; see also Van
Komen, 160 Idaho at 540 (“the court in its own words relinquished jurisdiction solely because
Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right and answer questions that could
incriminate him and result in new felony charges.  The court’s action violated Defendant’s Fifth
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(1/10/17 Tr., p.33, L.8 – p.34, L.14 (footnote added); see also R., pp.47-48.)  Mr. Reed was in
fact relinquished because he did not participate in the polygraph, a penalty which amounted to
compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. See Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 539-41.
Therefore, the district court violated Mr. Reed’s Fifth Amendment rights, failed to act
consistently with the applicable legal standards, and thus abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction.  Since the district court made the same erroneous decision it made in Van Komen,
this Court should, as it did in Van Komen, vacate that order and remand the case for further
proceedings before a new judge.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Sentencing Mr. Reed Largely Based On His
Alleged Prior Sex Crimes Rather Than The Methamphetamine Possession Conviction At Issue
The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
which asks whether the lower court: (1) rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards;
and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229
(Ct. App. 1999).  “A trial judge may consider a myriad of factors in imposing a sentence. . . .
includ[ing] a defendant’s past criminal history and, with due caution, the existence of [a]
defendant’s alleged criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where charges
have been dismissed.” State v. Heffern, 130 Idaho 946, 949-50 (Ct. App. 1997); see also
Amendment rights.”). As explained above, however, that basis for relinquishment was equally
invalid because Mr. Reed could not afford to pay for Good Samaritan.
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Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229.  The court abuses its discretion, however, by essentially imposing a
sentence for offenses other than the one actually before the court. Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229.
Here, the district court acted outside of the boundaries of its discretion and did not reach
its decision by an exercise of reason because it essentially sentenced Mr. Reed for his prior sex
offenses, some of which were unproven or disputed, and not the methamphetamine possession
charge that was before the court.  The court’s focus at sentencing was clear:  It explained that it
ordinarily does not “put a whole lot of importance in things in a presentence report’s prior
criminal reiteration,” but then asked Mr. Reed to explain each of the sex and domestic crimes
listed in his PSI.  (5/24/16 Tr., p.19, L.24 – p.25, L.14; PSI, pp.6-13.)  It asked Mr. Reed about
the tattoo on his neck that says “trust no bitch” (5/24/16 Tr., p.25, L.14 – p.26, L.7; PSI, p.4), and
ordered Mr. Reed to take a polygraph “regarding your account of past sexual offenses and past
violence towards women” (5/24/16 Tr., p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.1).    And, in its own words, the
court sentenced Mr. Reed as it did because of his prior alleged sex offenses.  (5/24/16 Tr., p.27,
Ls.7-14  (“The  reason  for  your  sentence  is  your  criminal  record,  and  while  I  realize  that  there
were  dismissals  on  the  sex  crimes  that  I  asked  you  about,  I  have  several  concerns  about  your
explanation given the fact that there are three different events over the course of . . . five
different years.  There’s violence to women on multiple occasions.”); see also 5/1/17 Tr., p.17,
L.20 – p.20, L.22 (the district court explaining, while denying Mr. Reed’s Rule 35 motion, that
he had done “nothing to assure the Court that the risk posed in his presentence report as to prior
sex offenses and abuse towards women has been mitigated at all, and it’s not just one event.”).)
The  court’s  decision  therefore  focused  on  Mr.  Reed’s  prior  alleged  sex  offenses,  and
whether Mr. Reed posed a danger to society based on those past offenses, while it mentioned his
drug use as a mere afterthought.  (See 5/24/16 Tr., p.27, Ls.14 – p.27, L.20 (“You’ve got a huge
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drug  problem  .  .  .  .   You  need  to  get  .  .  .  chemical  dependency  [treatment]  while  in  the
penitentiary.”).) In short, the record in this case at the very least “suggests that the district court
went beyond this authority and essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the one that
was before the court.” Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229.  The court therefore abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr.  Reed  respectfully  requests  that  this  Court  remand  this  case  for  a  new  rider  review
hearing in front of a new judge or reduce Mr. Reed’s sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2017.
            /s/
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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